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EQUAL TREATMENT | PART 2 OF 7 When a Bank Calls You High Risk

Part two of MMO’s Equal Treatment investigation examines how lawful compliance systems, sanctions screening and de-risking can turn internationally connected customers into permanent compliance problems.

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Original cover: My Morocco Observer · Equal Treatment?, Part 2. Photo source ↗
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Originally published by My Morocco Observer

Part 2 of 7 in the Equal Treatment? series. Original publication: 11 Jul 2026. Read the original article ↗

How KYC, Anti-Money-Laundering Controls and Automated Screening Can Turn an Ordinary Customer Into a Compliance Problem

A payment is delayed. The bank asks who received the money. Then it asks why.

For the customer, this may not feel like a routine check. It can feel like the beginning of an investigation whose rules are invisible, whose duration is unknown and whose underlying suspicion is never clearly stated.

A transfer to a relative, supplier or property transaction abroad produces another question. Where did the money originate? Why was that country involved? What is the relationship with the recipient? What does the customer’s company actually do? Who owns the business on the other side of the transaction?

The customer is told that the questions are required by law. The bank may be unable, or unwilling, to explain precisely what triggered them. The customer must then prove that ordinary activity is legitimate without knowing exactly why it was classified as unusual. That imbalance sits at the heart of the modern banking relationship.

Banks must protect the financial system from organised crime, corruption, sanctions evasion and terrorist financing. Their responsibilities are substantial, and the consequences of failure can be severe. But the same system can also produce disproportionate scrutiny, repeated demands and financial exclusion.

The question is not whether banks should investigate risk. They must. The question is whether they can demonstrate that the heaviest scrutiny is directed at the highest actual risk, and not repeatedly at customers whose names, international connections, family relationships or business activities merely resemble the profiles that compliance systems have learned to distrust.

Why Banks Ask Intrusive Questions

A bank compliance review illustrates why anti-money-laundering rules require intrusive customer questions

Money laundering is not a theoretical threat. Criminal organisations use legitimate companies, professional advisers, property transactions, cash-intensive businesses, international trade and ordinary bank accounts to conceal the origin of illicit funds. Sanctions regimes add another layer of responsibility. Banks must prevent payments from reaching listed individuals and entities, sometimes across complex international ownership structures.

Dutch banks therefore operate as gatekeepers to the financial system. They must identify customers, understand the purpose of banking relationships, monitor transactions and investigate activity that appears inconsistent with what they know about a customer. Higher-risk cases can require enhanced due diligence.

This may involve questions about the source of funds, the source of wealth, beneficial ownership, foreign business partners, unusual transaction patterns, political exposure, higher-risk jurisdictions, cash activity, sanctions connections and the economic purpose of payments.

These responsibilities are legitimate. A bank that fails to ask necessary questions can enable serious crime. It may also face regulatory enforcement, financial penalties and major reputational damage. From the bank’s perspective, caution is rational. A missed warning signal can become a national scandal. An unnecessary question usually creates far less institutional risk.

That produces a powerful incentive. When uncertainty exists, ask more. When documentation appears incomplete, delay. When a customer profile is difficult to understand, escalate. When the risk becomes expensive to manage, consider ending the relationship. Each decision may appear defensible from inside the compliance department. The cumulative effect on customers can be very different.

How an Ordinary Customer Becomes High Risk

Banks do not generally begin by declaring that a customer is suspicious. They construct a profile. That profile combines information collected when an account is opened with subsequent transaction data and changing regulatory risks. A customer may be classified according to residence, occupation, business model, expected turnover, countries involved, payment behaviour and the complexity of ownership structures.

The classification is not necessarily permanent. But once a customer enters a higher-risk category, the consequences can reinforce the original assessment. More questions produce more information. More information creates more possible inconsistencies. An explanation that differs slightly from an earlier description can generate another alert. A transaction that would appear ordinary in isolation may be considered unusual because it does not match the profile created by the bank.

The profile then begins to shape how the customer is interpreted. A property investor receiving money from several jurisdictions may look complex. An importer paying multiple international suppliers may look unpredictable. A restaurant depositing cash may be considered more difficult to monitor. A family transferring money between the Netherlands, Morocco, Turkey, Suriname or the Caribbean may create cross-border activity that requires explanation.

A customer is not necessarily classified as higher risk because of one suspicious act. Risk can emerge from a combination of otherwise legitimate characteristics. That is where the distinction between genuine risk and proxy-based suspicion becomes critical.

When Neutral Signals Become Proxies

A bank does not need to ask about ethnicity to treat customers of different backgrounds differently. A name can trigger sanctions screening. A country connection can increase a risk score. A transfer to family abroad can generate questions. A foreign-language payment description may require manual review. A business sector statistically associated with cash or fraud can result in enhanced scrutiny.

Each indicator may have a legitimate compliance purpose. Yet those indicators do not affect all customers equally. A customer with a common Dutch name may be less likely to share part of that name with an individual appearing on a sanctions list populated disproportionately by names from particular regions. A person whose entire economic life is domestic will face fewer country-risk questions than someone with family, property or commercial relationships abroad. A customer whose income arrives through a conventional salary will usually be easier to assess than an entrepreneur operating across borders.

The process may therefore appear formally neutral while producing concentrated burdens. This is the central difficulty of indirect discrimination. The rule does not explicitly select people by ethnic origin. Its practical effect may still disadvantage them disproportionately.

The ING Case

A ruling involving ING showed how this can happen in practice. The case concerned payments that were blocked and examined after a partial match between a name connected to the transaction and names appearing on European sanctions lists.

ING did not explicitly select the customer because of ethnic origin. It screened transactions to prevent funds from reaching sanctioned individuals or entities, a legitimate objective and a serious legal responsibility. But the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights found that sanctions lists contain predominantly non-Dutch-sounding names. A screening method based on partial name matches would therefore affect people with such names more frequently. The Institute concluded that the system resulted in indirect discrimination on the ground of origin.

It accepted that sanctions screening served a legitimate objective. It also accepted that transaction screening could contribute to achieving that objective. The decisive issue was necessity and proportionality. ING argued that extensive screening was required because sanctions violations could produce severe consequences and because individually investigating every transaction before raising questions would be impractical.

The Institute nevertheless found that the consequences for customers of non-Dutch origin were serious and that ING had not sufficiently demonstrated that the disproportionate impact of the method was objectively justified. The way the bank communicated with affected customers also played an important role. The Institute noted the absence of meaningful personal explanation or clarification.

The significance of the case extends beyond one bank and one customer. It demonstrates that a compliance process can pursue a lawful goal, use apparently neutral criteria and still produce unlawful discrimination. Good intentions do not answer the question. Neither does regulatory pressure. The method, necessity, communication and practical impact must also be examined.

One Document Too Many

Banks rarely tell customers that they are suspected of money laundering. Instead, customers receive requests. Provide the sale agreement. Explain the transfer. Identify the sender. Supply tax returns. Show invoices. Clarify the company structure. Demonstrate the origin of savings accumulated over many years. Explain why money moved through a foreign account. Confirm the relationship with a family member.

In many cases, these requests are justified. The difficulty begins when the customer cannot determine what would be sufficient. One document leads to another. A bank may ask for the origin of a payment and then for the origin of the funds used by the person who made that payment. It may request evidence covering periods beyond the transaction under review. It may consider authentic documents insufficient because they do not answer an internal concern that has never been disclosed.

The Process Becomes Asymmetric

An asymmetric compliance process leaves the customer answering questions about a concern never disclosed

The bank knows the alert. It knows the internal risk classification. It knows which combination of variables triggered further review. The customer sees only the questions. The customer is expected to provide a complete answer to a concern that may never be fully revealed.

There are legitimate reasons for some of this opacity. Banks cannot disclose every monitoring threshold or detection method without helping criminals understand how to avoid scrutiny. But secrecy designed to protect the system can also make it extremely difficult for an innocent customer to challenge disproportionate treatment. A person cannot easily correct a risk indicator they are not permitted to see. Nor can they know whether the bank has genuinely returned them to an ordinary risk category after satisfactory evidence has been supplied. The original flag may continue to influence future transactions. A single compliance event can therefore become a lasting shadow over the banking relationship.

The Compliance Incentive Problem

The strongest defence of banks is also one of the clearest explanations for overcompliance. Banks operate under intense pressure to avoid failure. Regulators expect effective monitoring. Governments expect institutions to prevent criminal money from entering the economy. The public condemns banks when major laundering schemes are discovered. Law-enforcement agencies depend partly on the reports financial institutions submit.

A compliance officer who closes a legitimate account may cause serious hardship for one customer. A compliance officer who overlooks a criminal network may expose the bank to enforcement action, public outrage and enormous financial consequences. The incentives are therefore not balanced. False negatives can be catastrophic for the institution. False positives are usually suffered by the customer.

This does not mean compliance professionals act maliciously. It means the system naturally rewards excessive caution unless proportionality is actively protected. Requesting one unnecessary document may appear prudent. Freezing one additional payment may appear defensible. Escalating one extra file may appear responsible. But when thousands of precautionary decisions fall disproportionately on people with international or migration backgrounds, excessive caution becomes a public equality issue.

One in Three

Research commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Finance found that around one in ten respondents experienced discrimination in their interactions with banks and payment institutions. Among respondents with a migration background, the figure rose to approximately one in three.

Reported experience is not the same as a legal finding. A customer may interpret strict but legitimate compliance controls as discriminatory. The individual may not possess all the information used by the bank. The institution may have objective reasons that cannot be fully disclosed. But a disparity of this magnitude is a warning signal. When one group reports the same problem several times more frequently than another, the burden of explanation shifts to the institutions creating the differential impact.

The appropriate response is not to presume that every allegation is correct. Nor is it to assume that customers have simply misunderstood lawful controls. The proper response is to investigate which processes produce the difference. Do certain risk factors operate as proxies for origin? Are customers with foreign connections asked more questions even after actual transaction risk has been considered? Are files escalated because they require more costly manual assessment? How often are banking relationships terminated after enhanced due diligence? How frequently are initial alerts found to be false? Do banks measure how false positives are distributed across customer groups?

Without answers to those questions, neither banks nor the public can determine whether the burden is proportionate.

What DNB Found

De Nederlandsche Bank examined how banks attempt to prevent discrimination while complying with anti-money-laundering and sanctions requirements. Its review covered 25 banks serving 98% of Dutch retail and small-business customers. The importance of that sample is difficult to overstate. This was not a marginal corner of the financial sector. It represented almost the entire Dutch market for individuals and smaller businesses.

DNB found that banks reported a broad range of measures, but that their specificity and focus varied substantially. Some institutions had targeted safeguards linked directly to customer due diligence and transaction monitoring. Others relied more heavily on general codes of conduct, broad diversity policies or training that did not necessarily address the specific mechanisms through which unequal treatment can arise.

That distinction matters. A general commitment to equality is not the same as testing whether a sanctions-screening model produces unequal false positives. A diversity course does not reveal whether customers from certain backgrounds experience longer investigations. A code of conduct does not measure whether particular countries, names or business sectors become automatic substitutes for individual risk.

DNB subsequently reported progress. Banks had adopted broader definitions of discrimination, improved risk analyses, clarified responsibility and strengthened training. Yet indirect discrimination remained a central concern. That challenge is built into the architecture of modern compliance. Direct discrimination is easier to identify. A policy explicitly excluding customers of one nationality would be obvious. Indirect discrimination can be hidden inside combinations of variables, thresholds and operational choices. The system may never mention origin. It may still reproduce its effects.

De-Risking Is Not Risk Management

When a customer becomes difficult or expensive to monitor, a bank faces a choice. It can invest time and expertise in understanding that customer. It can impose tailored controls. Or it can remove the risk by removing the customer. The final option is commonly described as de-risking.

Ending a relationship can sometimes be justified. A bank should not be required to retain a customer when serious risks cannot be understood or managed, when legally required information is withheld or when there is credible evidence of criminal activity. But de-risking becomes problematic when institutions reject or remove entire categories of customers instead of examining individual circumstances.

The European Banking Authority has warned that unwarranted de-risking can exclude legitimate customers from essential financial services. It has emphasised that refusing or terminating one relationship after an individual assessment may be compatible with anti-money-laundering rules. Treating whole customer categories as unmanageable, without proper consideration of individual risk, can be unwarranted and may indicate ineffective risk management.

This creates a regulatory contradiction. Banks may be penalised for failing to detect risk, while simultaneously being warned against excluding customers for the wrong reasons. The institution is caught between two supervisory expectations. But the contradiction does not eliminate responsibility. It makes proportionality more important.

De-risking does not always make the financial system safer. It can push legitimate activity outside mainstream banking. It can make transactions less transparent. It can deprive vulnerable people of access to essential services. It can transfer customers to institutions with fewer resources without improving the underlying assessment of risk. Refusing complexity is not the same as managing it.

The Customer’s Impossible Position

A customer facing account restrictions confronts an impossible position with limited immediate protection

A customer whose account is restricted or terminated may have several theoretical options. They can complain to the bank. They can approach an external complaints body. They can seek legal advice. They can submit a discrimination complaint. They can try to open an account elsewhere.

In practice, these routes may provide limited immediate protection. A small business can lose suppliers while a complaint is pending. An employer may be unable to pay salaries. A family may miss a property payment. An entrepreneur can lose access to working capital. A customer may discover that another bank asks similar questions without knowing whether shared risk assumptions or external databases have followed them. Even where a decision is eventually reversed, the commercial or personal damage may already have occurred.

The institution also controls most of the evidence. It possesses the risk assessment. It knows which alert was generated. It holds the internal correspondence. It understands whether the case was escalated manually or automatically. The customer usually has only the questions received and the consequences experienced. This produces a procedural paradox. The customer may need evidence of disproportionate treatment to challenge the bank. But much of the evidence required to establish that treatment is held by the bank itself.

What Banks Are Entitled to Say

Fair journalism must recognise the strongest institutional response. Banks are entitled to say that they did not create the international money-laundering threat. They are entitled to point to extensive legal duties, supervisory expectations and sanctions regimes. They are entitled to protect monitoring methods from disclosure that would help criminals circumvent controls. They are entitled to request convincing evidence when transactions do not match a customer’s expected profile. They are entitled to terminate relationships when serious risks cannot be managed.

They are also entitled to argue that differences in customer treatment may reflect differences in activity rather than origin. International transfers require more analysis than domestic salary payments. Complex ownership structures require more work than simple personal accounts. Cash-intensive businesses generate different risks from conventional employment. Payments involving sanctioned or higher-risk jurisdictions cannot be treated as entirely ordinary.

All of this is true. But none of it provides automatic immunity from scrutiny. The existence of genuine risk does not establish that every method used to manage it is proportionate. A legal obligation to screen transactions does not justify every screening design. The need for confidentiality does not eliminate the need for accountability. A rational explanation for one decision does not answer whether thousands of individually rational decisions combine into a structurally unequal result.

What Banks Must Be Able to Demonstrate

A credible banking system should be able to answer more than whether its controls detect danger. It should also understand what those controls do to legitimate customers. How many alerts are false positives? How are those false positives distributed? Which customer groups experience the longest reviews? How often do partial name matches result in unnecessary blocks? How frequently are small businesses removed because monitoring them is too expensive? Are country-risk indicators applied to the transaction itself or to the customer’s broader identity? Can frontline employees challenge automated classifications? Does a customer return to an ordinary risk category after supplying sufficient evidence? Or does the initial alert continue to shape every future interaction?

These are not demands for banks to publish their criminal-detection manuals. They are basic questions of governance. An institution cannot credibly claim that a system is proportionate if it measures only threats detected and not the innocent customers burdened.

The Question Is Not Simply Why Me?

Customers often ask: Why me? The bank may not be able to answer fully. The more important question should therefore be directed at the system: can the bank demonstrate that the customers facing the most intrusive scrutiny also present the greatest evidence-based risk?

That is the standard that matters. Not whether a model is technically neutral. Not whether an individual compliance officer acted without prejudice. Not whether the bank can identify a legal duty. The test is whether the process is necessary, proportionate and capable of distinguishing customers who are complex from customers who are dangerous.

An international life is not evidence of crime. A foreign surname is not evidence of sanctions evasion. A cash-intensive sector is not proof of money laundering. A family transfer is not inherently suspicious. These factors may justify questions. They cannot replace individual assessment.

The Burden Must Not Remain Invisible

Banks occupy a uniquely powerful position. They do not merely provide an optional private service. They control access to salaries, housing, commerce, taxation, savings and participation in the formal economy. For most people, functioning without a bank account is not a realistic choice. Financial inclusion is therefore more than a customer-service issue. It is a condition of modern citizenship.

The state can require banks to act as gatekeepers. But when private institutions exercise quasi-public power, the safeguards must be equally serious. Customers should not be treated as dangerous because their lives are more complex to understand. Banks should not be rewarded for replacing risk management with exclusion. Regulators should not measure success only through penalties, reports and intercepted transactions. They must also examine the collateral damage produced by the system they supervise.

The less powerful do not need banks to stop investigating crime. They need the investigation of crime to remain tied to evidence. They need suspicion to be temporary rather than inherited by every future transaction. They need an understandable route to correct inaccurate profiles. They need proportionality to function as an operational discipline, not as a principle invoked after the damage has already occurred.

The integrity of the financial system matters. So does the integrity of the methods used to protect it. When an ordinary, yet internationally connected, customer becomes high risk, the classification should never be the end of the explanation. It should be the beginning of accountability.

This is Part Two of MMO’s Equal Treatment? investigation.

Sources & Methodology

This investigation is based on official regulatory publications, equality rulings and public institutional findings concerning customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, sanctions screening, indirect discrimination, de-risking and access to financial services.

The principal sources include De Nederlandsche Bank’s work on countering discrimination by banks in Wwft compliance, in which DNB surveyed 25 banks that together served 98% of Dutch retail and SME customers and found substantial variation in the specificity and focus of antidiscrimination measures; De Nederlandsche Bank’s Annual Report 2025, which reported continuing work on preventing unjustified exclusion and indirect discrimination in the application of anti-money-laundering and sanctions rules; the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights Decision 2024-63, in which the Institute found that ING’s transaction-screening method resulted in indirect discrimination and was not sufficiently demonstrated to be necessary and objectively justified in the case assessed; the European Banking Authority guidelines on unwarranted de-risking and access to financial services, which state that excluding entire categories of customers without properly considering individual risk can be unwarranted and may demonstrate ineffective risk management; and the European Banking Authority’s broader work on the impact of de-risking on access to financial services and participation in economic and social life.

Reported experiences of discrimination do not automatically constitute legally established discrimination. MMO distinguishes between customer perceptions, regulatory findings, equality decisions and its own institutional analysis. MMO received no funding or compensation from any bank, regulator, public authority, campaign group or other party mentioned in this investigation. The sources relied upon are publicly available. Any institution facing substantive criticism will be offered a full right of reply before publication.

Call for Evidence

My Morocco Observer invites customers, entrepreneurs, compliance professionals, lawyers, academics, regulators and current or former bank employees to contribute evidence relevant to this investigation. MMO is particularly interested in documented cases involving prolonged or repeated KYC reviews; unexplained transaction blocks; sanctions-screening name matches; extensive source-of-funds requests; business-account closures; refusal of banking services; international transfers; country or nationality-related risk classifications; successful complaints or legal proceedings; and internal safeguards that reduced discrimination risks.

Submission does not guarantee publication or imply that MMO accepts an allegation as fact. Cases will be assessed independently. Supporting documents may be requested. Confidentiality can be discussed with sources. Any institution facing substantive criticism will be offered a full opportunity to respond before publication.

About the Investigation

Equal Treatment? is an ongoing My Morocco Observer investigative series examining institutional decision-making, proportionality and public trust in the Netherlands. MMO bases its reporting on official documentation, public data, legal decisions, expert analysis and verified personal accounts. The purpose is not to presume guilt or innocence. It is to establish whether the promise of equal treatment survives contact with institutional practice.

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